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Abstract. We present the first key-management functionality in the
Universal Composability (UC) framework. It allows the enforcement of a
wide range of security policies and can be extended by diverse key usage
operations with no need to repeat the security proof. We illustrate its use
by proving an implementation of a Security API secure with respect to
arbitrary key-usage operations and explore a proof technique that allows
the storage of cryptographic keys externally, a novel development in the
UC framework.
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1 Introduction
Security critical applications often store keys on dedicated hardware security mod-
ules (HSM) or key-management servers to separate highly sensitive cryptographic
operations from more vulnerable parts of the network. Access to such devices
is given to protocol parties by the means of Security APIs. Examples of such
APIs are the RSA PKCS#11 standard [RSA04], IBM’s CCA [CCA06] and the
trusted platform module (TPM) [TCG07] API. Building on the work of Longley
and Rigby [LR92] and Bond and Anderson [BA01] on API attacks, several recent
papers have investigated the security of APIs on the logical level, often using
symbolic techniques for protocol analysis, e. g., [BCFS10,CKS07,DKS10]. More
recent work has tried to define appropriate security notions for APIs in terms of
cryptographic games [CC09,KSW11]. This has two major disadvantages: first, it is
not clear how the security notion will compose with other protocols implemented
by the API, and second, it is difficult to see whether a definition covers the attack
model completely, since the game can be tailored to a design. For example, the
security game may not permit re-importing wrapped keys [CC09]. This illustrates
that game-based definitions are very difficult to get right in this domain. Since
security APIs are first and foremost used as building blocks in other protocols,
composability is crucial. In this work, we will follow the more general approach
to API security of Kremer et al. [KSW11], but using a framework that allows for
composition.
Composability can be proven in frameworks for simulation-based security, such
as Universal Composability (UC) [Can05]. The requirements of a protocol are
formalized by abstraction: an ideal functionality computes the protocol’s inputs
and outputs securely, a ‘secure’ protocol is one that emulates the functionality.
Simulation-based security naturally models the composition of the API with
other protocols, so that proofs of security can be performed in a modular fashion.
Over time a number of shortcomings have been found in the UC framework,
leading to the contribution of other frameworks in the same spirit [BDHK07,HS11,Ku¨s06,MR11].
Some particular weaknesses of the UC framework are the following: First, it is
assumed that sessions of running protocols are identifiable by a (pre-established)
session identifier, abbreviated as sid , although it is possible to define composition
on protocols without such identifiers. For a Security API, one could argue that a
serial number constitutes such an identifier. Still, the identifier is part of every
incoming and outgoing message, which is a rather unrealistic modelling of locality
information. Second, adaptive corruption of parties, or of keys that produce an
encryption, provokes the well-known commitment problem [Hof08], so we will
have to place some limitations on the types of corruptions that can occur. We
therefore restrict the environment to avoid these problems. Third, the proof
of the composition theorem is flawed due to an inadequate formulation of the
composition operation [HS11], though here the authors remark that, “none of
the objections we raise point to gaps in security proofs of existing protocols.
Rather, they seem artifacts of the concrete technical formulation of the underlying
framework.”. We employ UC despite its shortcomings, because it is well-studied
and hence provides a common ground for transferring this first approach on
modelling key-management to other frameworks.
Contributions. We present, to the best of our knowledge, the first composable
definition of secure key-management in form of a key-management functionality
FKM. It assures that keys are transferred correctly from one Security API to
another, that the policy is respected and that operations which use keys are
computed correctly. The latter is achieved by describing operations unrelated to
key-management by so-called key-usage functionalities. FKM is parametric in
the policy and the set of key-usage functionalities, which can be arbitrary. This
facilitates revision of security devices, because changes to operations that are not
part of the key-management or the addition of new functions does not affect the
UC emulation proof. In order to achieve this extensibility, we investigate what
exactly a “key” means in simulation-based security. Common functionalities in
UC do not allow two parties to share the same key, in fact, they do not have a
concept of keys, but a concept of ‘the owner of a functionality’ instead. The actual
key is kept in the internal state of a functionality, used for computation, but
never output. Dealing with key-management, we need the capability to export
and import keys and we propose an abstraction of the concept of keys, that we
call credentials. The owner of a credential can not only compute a cryptographic
operation, but he can also delegate this capacity by transmitting the credential.
We think this concept is of independent interest, and as a further contribution,
subsequently introduce a general proof method that allows the substitution of
credentials by actual keys when instantiating a functionality.
Some aspects of the ideal functionality Fcrypto by Ku¨sters et al. [KT11] are
similar to our key-management functionality in that both provide cryptographic
primitives to a number of users and enjoy composability. However, the Fcrypto
approach aims at abstracting a specified set of cryptographic operations on client
machines to make the analysis of protocols in the UC model easier, and does not
address key-management nor policies.
Limitations. The key-management functionality is tightly coupled with a func-
tionality FKW used to transfer keys from one device to another. This functionality
describes a deterministic authenticated symmetric encryption scheme that is
secure against key-dependant messages. While deterministic, symmetric authenti-
cated encryption is indeed typically used to transfer keys (see, e. g., RFC 3394),
it restricts the analysis to security devices providing this kind of encryption. We
have not yet covered asymmetric encryption of keys in FKW (as opposed to
asymmetric encryption of user-supplied data), although FKW could in theory be
altered to support this.
2 A key-management functionality
In this section we introduce our key-management functionality FKM. We will work
in the 2005 version of Universal Composability (UC) framework [Can05], described
briefly below. We do not want to hard code the cryptographic operations, which
are orthogonal to the key management part that can be provided by our security
API. Therefore we introduce the notion of key-usage functionalities. Finally,
we will discuss the formalization of security policies, which define the expected
security guarantees. At the end of this section we give a detailed description of
the key-management functionality FKM.
2.1 Universal Composability
In the UC framework, the security goal of a protocol is specified by a so-called ideal
functionality, which acts as a third party and is trusted by all participants. A set of
users, the protocol parties, as well as a distinguished user, the adversary, interact
with the functionality using private, authenticated channels. Using the inputs of
the parties, the ideal functionality defines a secure way of computing anything the
protocol shall compute, explicitly computing the data that is allowed to leak to
the attacker. For instance, a secret channel is specified as a functionality that takes
a message from Alice and sends it to Bob, notifying the attacker of the length
of the message, which would be leaked if this channel were to be realized using
encryption. Each of the parties and functionalities are interactive probabilistic
polynomial time (PPT)—in a given complexity parameter η—Turing machines,
communicating via tapes. A protocol is a network of interactive PPT Turing
Machines that communicate with each other, but receive protocol inputs and send
protocol outputs to the environment. Roughly, security of a protocol is expressed
as indistinguishability of the protocol from an ideal system. We introduce another
party, the environment E , whose role is to distinguish whether it is interacting
with the ideal system (users interacting with an ideal functionality) or the real
system (users executing a protocol). We say that a protocol pi UC-emulates a
functionality F if for all attackers interacting with pi, there exists an attacker,
the simulator Sim, interacting with F , such that no environment can distinguish
between interacting with the attacker and the real protocol pi, or the simulation of
this attack (generated by Sim) and F . Canetti [Can05] showed that it is actually
not necessary to quantify over all possible adversaries: the most powerful adversary
is the attacker that merely acts as a relay forwarding all messages between the
environment and the protocol. This attacker is called the dummy-attacker D. We
will denote by EXECηpi,A,E (respectively IDEAL
η
F,A,E) the distribution over traces
generated by the execution of the system consisting of the protocol pi (respectively
a set of users interacting with the ideal functionality F), the adversary A and
the environment E . (EXECηpi,A,E)η and (IDEALηF,A,E)η denote the families of
distributions (ensembles) indexed by the complexity parameter η. We denote by
(D1)η ≈ (D2)η the usual notion of indistinguishability of ensembles. This allows
us to define UC realizability.
Definition 1 (UC realization). Let pi and F be PPT Turing machines. pi UC-
emulates F , denoted pi≤UC F , if ∃S. ∀E : (EXECηpi,D,E)η ≈ (IDEALηF,Sim,E)η
Canetti [Can05] has also shown that this notion of security is compositional and
that ideal functionalities can be replaced by their realization in an arbitrary
context, while preserving security properties. In some cases, in particular to
handle some forms of key corruption, we will have to assume conditions on the
environment. Then, of course, composition is limited to environments where those
conditions can be guaranteed to hold.
Definition 2 (Conditional UC realization). Let pi and F be PPT Turing
machines. pi UC-emulates F under condition C, denoted pi ≤CUC ,F) if ∃S. ∀E :∣∣∣Pr[EXECηpi,D,E = 1|C]− Pr[IDEALηF,Sim,E = 1|C]∣∣∣
is negligible in η and C is the event that the view of E fulfils some predicate.
2.2 Global Structure
One of the main problems in key-management is that a distributed system of
security tokens ST 1 . . . STm has to implement a security policy globally : ST 1
. . . STm should behave like a global key-storage device that everyone can access
securely and that assures that the policy is not violated. We use the concept of
UC emulation to express exactly that. We define a key-management functionality
FKM, detailed below in Listing 1.1, which is an abstraction of our expectation of
key-management.
In Figure 1, we sketch how ST 1,. . . ,STm UC-emulate the functionality in a
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Fig. 1. Distributed security tokens in the network (left-hand side) and idealized func-
tionality FKM in the same network (right-hand side), simplified.
and a number of other functionalities (depicted as circles) that will be presented
below. The environment accesses the security tokens, respectively FKM through
dummy users ϕi and φi: they take inputs from the environment and send them
to the Security API they are connected to (and vice versa). The only difference
between ϕi and φi is that ϕi forwards its input to ST i, while φi forwards it to
FKM. These users are needed to hide that in the ideal system the environment
interacts with a single machine while in the distributed implementation it interacts
with different security tokens.We will denote the network identity of both ϕi and
φi, with Ui and the adversary’s network identity with A.
To transfer a key from one security token to another in the real world, the
environment instructs, for instance, U1 to ask for a key to be wrapped. A wrapping
of a key is the encryption of a key with another key, the wrapping key, so that
it can be transferred from one security token to another without revealing the
key. The wrapping key must of course be on both security tokens prior to that.
U1 will receive the wrap from ST 1 and forward it to the environment, which
in turn instructs U2 to unwrap the data it just received from U1. In the ideal
world, FKM enforces that, if the wrapping that was just sent to U1 is unwrapped
by U2, then U2 gains access to the key that was only available to U1, and that
attributes associated with that key stay the same. ST 1 and ST 2 have to assure
the same properties, as otherwise the environment could distinguish between the
real world and the ideal world.
2.3 Key-Usage Functionalities
We classify cryptographic operations by whether they operate on user-data (with
keys), or on keys (with other keys). We call the latter key-management, the
former key-usage. We are specific about how keys are managed: we require the
key-management task to be solved using deterministic, authenticated, symmet-
ric encryption, provided by the functionality FKW (detailed in Appendix A).
However, for key-usage operations we do not care for much more than their cor-
rect implementation, thus keeping FKM extensible by all kinds of cryptographic
primitives.
In UC, a cryptographic operation is specified by a functionality F , a fact
that we will exploit for the definition of FKM. Let F1,. . . ,Fl be the key usage
functionalities (also depicted in Figure 1). For every key-usage operation, FKM
calls the corresponding KU-functionality, receives the response and outputs it
to the user. We define FKM for arbitrary key-usage operations, and consider
a security token secure, with respect to a certain policy and the implemented
KU-functionalities, if it emulates the ideal functionality FKM parametrized
by those KU-functionalities. This allows us to provide an implementation for
secure key-management with respect to a certain policy, and arbitrary key-usage
operations, see Section 3. We achieve composability in the following sense: if a
device performs the key-management according to our implementation, it does
not matter how many, and which functionalities it enables access to, as long as
those functionalities provide the amount of security the designer aims to achieve
(cf. Theorem 12). Notably, the KU-functionalities appear on both sides in Figure 1.
In Section 4, we show how to make use of the UC Theorem to instantiate a
KU-functionality by an implementation that UC-emulates it.
This approach imposes some mild assumptions on the KU-functionalities. The
computation of a KU-functionality F must be independent of the value of the
caller’s identity, as otherwise a response forwarded by FKM might differ from a
response forwarded by ST i. Many of the functionalities in, for example, [Can05]
bind the roles of the parties, e. g., signer and verifier, to network identities .
An implementation of those functionalities usually employs keys. However such
functionalities are not caller-independant. They fail to capture the fact that a
key allows to pass the capacity to, e. g., generate valid signatures for a certain
verification key from one ST to another.Therefore, the privilege to perform
an operation must be transferable as some piece of information, which cannot
be the actual key, if we want to prove such a functionality to be secure: a
signing functionality, for example, that exposes its keys to the environment is
not realizable, since the environment could then generate dishonest signatures
itself. The solution is to generate a key, but only send out a credential, which
is a hard-to-guess pointer that refers to this key. Whoever knows the credential
is allowed to sign. Keys not only allow a distinguished party, the owner of the
key, to perform operation but also allow delegation of this capacity. Abstraction
of ‘keys’ by ‘credentials’ is thus more powerful than abstraction of the ‘owner
of a key’ by a ‘fixed identity of party that is allowed to sign’. In our scenario,
where keys are exported, it is necessary to abstract keys. The requirements on a
KU-functionality are formalized by the following definitions.
Definition 3 (caller-independence). A functionality is F caller-independent
iff at any point of the execution of F with any environment, if m is a message
and id, id ′ are two identities of network parties, different from the adversary,
then the distributions of the outputs of F after receiving m from id, respectively
id ′, are the same.
Definition 4 (key-manageable functionality). A functionality F is key-
manageable iff it accepts requests of the form (Command, sid ,m) for a finite set of
commands C containing at least Generate, Corrupt ∈ C and CorruptionStatus ∈
C, and if it is caller independent.
The key-management functionality FKM expects the response to Generate to
be of the form (Generate•, sid , credential).
Remark 1: Since keys might be used to wrap other keys, we would like to
know how the loss of a key to the adversary affects the security of other keys.
When an adversary “corrupts a key” in FKM, he learns the credentials to access
the functionalities. The functionalities will not be notified immediately. However,
the adversary is able to use the credentials to corrupt the key in the functionality.
Remark 2: We require that the credentials for different KU-functionalities are
distinct. It is nonetheless possible to encrypt and decrypt arbitrary credentials
using FKW. Suppose a designer wants to prove a Secure API that uses shared keys
for different operations secure. One way or another, she would need to prove that
those roles do not interfere. For this case, we suggest providing a functionality
that combines the two KU-functionalities, and proving that the implementation
of the two operations combined UC-emulates the combined functionality. It is
possible to assign different attributes to keys of the same KU-functionality, and
thus restrict their use to certain commands, effectively providing different roles
for credentials to the same KU-functionality. This can be done by specifying two
attributes for the two roles and defining a policy that restricts which operation
is permitted for a key of each attribute.
Remark 3: Many commonly used UC-functionalities are not caller-independent,
often the access to critical functions is restricted to a network party that is encoded
in the session identifier. However, it is possible to construct caller-independent
functionalities for a large class of UC-functionalities, if the implementation relies
on keys but is otherwise stateless. See Section 5 for details.
2.4 Policies
Now that all credentials on different Security APIs in the network are abstracted
to a central storage, we can describe the implementation of a global policy. Every
credential in FKM has exactly one attribute from a set of attributes A.
Definition 5 (Policy). Given the KU-functionalities Fi, i ∈ {1, . . . , l} and
corresponding sets of commands Ci, the policy is a quaternary relation Π ⊂
{F1, . . . ,Fl,FKW}×∪i∈{1,...,l}Ci∪{New, Wrap, Unwrap, AttributeChange}×A×A
such that if (F , C, a, a′) ∈ Π and
– C = New, then FKM allows the creation of a new key for the functionality F
with attribute a.
– F = Fi and C ∈ Ci, then FKM will accept sending the command C to F , if
the handle used is of type F and has the attribute a.
– F = FKW and C = Wrap, then FKM allows the wrapping a key with attribute
a′ using a wrapping key with attribute a.
– F = FKW and C = Unwrap, then FKM allows the unwrapping of a wrapping
annotated with the attribute a′ using a wrapping key with attribute a.
– if C = AttributeChange, then FKM allows the changing of a key’s attribute
from a to a′.
The existence of the latter command implies that a key can have different
attributes set for different users of FKM, corresponding to different Security
APIs in the real word. Note that a′ is only relevant for the AttributeChange
command.
Therefore, attr in FKM maps a user and a handle (U, h) to an attribute,
rather than a key-index i = I(U, h).
The policy relation allows us to state exactly how attributes can be changed
and what implications they have. It is sufficiently expressive for many policies
employed in practice. In Section 3, we will consider a static key-hierarchy as an
example. Note that whether FKM and its KU-functionalities can be UC-realized
depends both on the policy and the functionalities.
2.5 The Key Management Functionality FKM
A detailed description of FKM is given in Listing 1.1. By convention, the response
to a query (Command, sid , . . .) is always of the form (Command•, sid , . . .), or ⊥.
One may note that at any time the attacker may send queries on behalf of any
corrupted user.
The principle structure of FKM is that of a proxy service to the KU-functionalities.
It is possible to create keys (Generate,. . . ), which means that FKM asks the
KU-functionality for the credentials and stores them, but outputs only a handle
referring to the key. When a command is C ∈ Ci is called with a handle and a
message, FKM substitutes the handle with the associated credential, and forwards
the output to Fi, but only if this is in accordance with the policy. The response
from Fi is forwarded unaltered.
The commands that are important for key-management are handled by FKM
itself. It is possible to wrap and unwrap a key. Here, FKM makes use of the key-
wrapping functionality FKW discussed in Section A (see Listing 1.8 on page 27
for its definition). Note that the user can choose an identifier that is bound to
a wrapping in order to identify which key was wrapped. This could, e. g., be
a key digest provided by the KU-functionality the key belongs to. If not given
explicitly, we assume that FKW only leaks the length of the key that is wrapped,
i. e., the leakage function La(k1, k2) returns a bitstring of length |k2| drawn from
a uniform random distribution for each a, k1 and k2.
When a wrapped key is unwrapped, FKM checks if this key is in its database
already. If this is the case, a new handle h′ for the user U ′ is created and mapped
to the same index i that references the credentials and the type of the key. Since
it is possible to change a key’s attributes using the command (AttributeChange),
the pair (U ′, h′) identifies the key’s attribute, instead of the index i.
Key-management is of limited interest without pre-shared keys as it would not
allow us to migrate keys from one device to another. Therefore we model a setup
phase: Room is a list of users in a secure environment that are allowed to share
keys during the set-up phase, which means that the implementation is allowed
to use secure channels to transport keys during this phase, but not later. On a
physical device this would correspond to pre-installed keys at manufacturing time
or installation of keys by an administrator using a trusted machine. Once the
setup phase is finished the functionality enters the run phase. During this phase
users may create new keys, wrap and unwrap keys, change their attributes and
send commands to the key usage functionalities. Note that keys are identified by
a pair (user, handle) and all queries are checked against the policy. The adversary
A may corrupt handles. The UC framework does not provide a global register
for corrupted keys, so to avoid the simulator corrupting handles the adversary
did not corrupt unnoticed, the environment can check the corruption status of a
handle. Before defining FKM, we will define the relevant parameters describing
the network to be modelled.
Definition 6 (Parameters to a Security Token Network). We summarize
the parameters of a Security Token Network(cf. 9) as a tuple (Φ,Φext,Room,F , Π),
where
– Φ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm} are the dummy users with network identities U1, . . . , Um,
– Φext = {ϕm+1, . . . , ϕm+n} are the external dummy users with identities
E1, . . . , En,
– Room ⊂ Φ,
– F = {(F1, C1), . . . , (Fl, Cl)} are key-manageable functionalities with corre-
sponding sets of commands, and FKM 6∈ {F1, . . . ,Fl},
– and Π is a policy for F
Definition 7 (FKM). With respect to the parameters (Φ,Φext,Room,F ,Π),
FKM is defined in the following listing. In addition, whenever a lookup of I
fails, it responds by sending ⊥ to the querier. FKM has one thread per dummy
user in Φ.
structure:
I : (u, h) 7→ index #functions mapping user and handle to index
type(i) # maps an index to a functionality
credentials(i) #credentials to access functionality
attr(u, h) #attribute that policy assigns to a user’s handle
List of Corruption requests
In all phases:
rcv (m1, . . . ,mk, U) from A:
if U has been corrupted before
proceed like rcv (m1 . . .mk) from U
phase setup:
rcv (New,sid,F ,a) from any U ∈ Room
if ((F ,New,a,∗)∈ Π)
create fresh h,i; update I such that I(U, h) 7→ i
snd (Generate,sid) to F ; rcv (Generate•,sid,s) from F
save credentials (i):=s, attr (U, h):=a, type(i):=F
snd (Generate•, sid, h) to U
else snd ⊥ to U
rcv (Share, sid, (U1, h1), (U2, h2)) from U1 ∈ Room
if I(U2, h2) does not exist and U2 ∈ Room I(U2, h2):=I(U1, h1)
snd (Share•,sid) to U1
else snd ⊥ to U1
rcv (FinishSetup) from any U ∈ Room
send (FinishSetup•,sid) to U and enter phase run
phase run:
rcv (New,sid,F ,a) from U ∈ U for some F ∈ {F1, . . . ,Fl,FKW}... #behave as in setup phase
rcv (Wrap,sid,h1,h2,id) from U:
if (FKW, ”Wrap”,attr(U,h1),attr(U,h2))∈ Π
snd (Wrap,sid,credentials(I(U, h1)),
<attr(U,h2),type(I(U, h2)),id>,credentials(I(U, h2))) to FKW
rcv (Wrap•, sid, c) from FKW snd (Wrap•, sid, c) to U
else snd ⊥ to U
rcv (Unwrap,sid,h1, w, a, type, id) from U:
if (FKW, ”Unwrap”,attr(U,h1),a)∈ Π
snd (Unwrap,sid,credentials(I(U, h1)),<a,type,id>,w) to FKW
rcv (Unwrap•, sid, m) from FKW
if i′ exists such that type(i′)=type and credentials(i′)=m
create fresh h′; I(U,h′):=i′





type(i′):=type; credentials(i′):=m; attr(U,h′):=a; I(U,h′):=i′
snd (Unwrap•, sid, h′) to U
else snd ⊥ to U
rcv (AttributeChange, sid , h, a new) from U:
if (type(I(U, h)),’’AttributeChange’’,attr(U,h),a new)∈ Π
attr (U,h):=a new
else snd ⊥ to U
rcv (Command,sid,h,m) from U, for Command ∈ Ci
if (type(I(U,h))=Fi and (type(I(U,h)), Command, attr(U,h),∗)∈ Π)
snd (Command, sid, credentials(I(U,h)),m) to Fi
rcv (Command•, sid, m) from Fi; snd (Command•, sid, m) to U
else snd ⊥ to U
rcv (Corrupt,sid,(U,h)) from A
snd (Corrupt•, sid, credentials(i)) to A; save corruption request for (U, h)
rcv (CorruptionStatus,sid,h) from U
if corruption request for (U, h) was saved
snd (CorruptionStatus•,sid,Corrupted) to U
else snd ⊥ to U 
Listing 1.1. A key-management functionality FKM
In standard UC, proving that a network of security tokens UC-realizes FKM
in the F1, . . . ,Fl,FKW would not be strong enough for our purposes, because
the environment could not access the KU-functionalities directly. A signature
functionality, for example, might provide an interface to verify signatures to users
that do not have a Security Token. Instead, we define a protocol in which those
functionalities interact and a number of external users (Φext) has direct access to
the KU-functionalities. Technically, this protocol is modelled as a network, not
as a functionality (although the protocol machines are, in fact, functionalities).
Definition 8 (FKM-Network). The network FKM−Net(Φ,Φext,Room,F,Π) is the
network where all φ ∈ Φ are dummy parties to FKM (instantiated for the same
parameters), which itself communicates (via subroutine input tapes) with all
F ∈ F and FKW. Additionally, every external dummy user φext ∈ Φext allows
the environment to adress each F ∈ F .
Definition 9 (Security Token Network). Given an implementation of key-
management ST and parameters (Φ,Φext,Room,F ,Π), we define the Security
Token Network STNST,Φ,Φext,Room,F,Π as the network where m = |Φ| dummy
users φ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} are each connected to a Security Token ST i, and each ST i
is connected to all F1, . . . ,Fl, to FKW and to FSIMT. Additionally, each external
dummy user ϕext ∈ Φext is connected to each F ∈ F .
Definition 10 (Secure Key-Management). An Security Token ST is secure
(under condition C) with respect to (Φ,Φext,Room,F , Π) iff STNST,Φ,Φext,Room,F,Π
UC-emulates FKM−Net(Φ,Φext,Room,F,Π) (under condition C).
A protocol piF
KM−Net that calls FKM−Net(Φ,Φext,Room,F,Π) is subroutine re-
specting, i. e., the sub-parties of FKM−Net(Φ,Φext,Room,F,Π), in particular the
KU-functionalities, exchange input/output only with parties (the external dummy
users Φext) or sub-parties (FKM) of FKM−Net. This is a neccesary condition for
the Universal Composition Theorem. In consequence, for very pi and ST secure
with respect to (Φ,Φext,Room,F , Π), piFKM−Net/STN UC-emulates piFKM−Net.
3 Realizing key-management for static key-hierarchies
To illustrate our definition and demonstrate its usefulness, we now implement
a Security API which allows arbitrary key-usage functionalities and a policy
that enforces a hierarchical key-structure. The policy guarantees that corruption
of lower-level keys does not impair the security of higher-level keys. We stress
that our implementation describes a way to implement a Security API for key-
management that is independent of the key-usage functions it provides. Extending
FKM and the implementation by a new KU-functionality does not require a new
proof.
The implementation of a secure token ST is, like FKM, based on the key-
wrapping functionality FKW. We assume a secure environment for the set-up
phase, permitting all users in the set Room to generate keys and share them
among each others. This is implemented by the functionality FSIMT, defined
in Listing 1.2 below. This secure channel is only used during the set-up phase.
FSIMT is designed after FSIMT from [Can05], with two differences: (i) there is
no corruption, because we want to simulate a secure set-up phase, and nothing
more; (ii) the adversary is not notified when a message is sent.
sid = (S,R, sid ′)
rcv (Send,sid ,m) from S
snd (Sent,sid ,m) to R and halt forever 
Listing 1.2. A Secure Instantenous Message Transmission Funct. FSIMT
The implementation ST is inspired by the implementation introduced in
[KSW11]. There is an improvement that became apparent during the proof of
UC emulation (Theorem 12 below). Namely, when unwrapping with a corrupted
key, FKM checks the attribute that is going to be assigned to the (imported) key
against the policy, instead of just accepting that a corrupted wrapping-key might
just import any wrapping the attacker generated. This prevents, for example, that
a corrupted wrapping-key of low security creates a high-security wrapping-key by
unwrapping dishonestly produced wrappings. This detail in the definition of FKM
enforces a stronger implementation than the one in [KSW11]: ST validates the
attribute given with a wrapping, enforcing that it is at least sound according to
the policy, instead of blindly trusting the authenticity of the wrapping mechanism.
Hence our implementation is more robust.
Definition 11 (ST). Given parameters (Φ,Φext,Room,F ,Π), the ST that is
connected to the dummy-user ϕi with identity Ui is defined in the following listing.
In addition, whenever a lookup to List fails, or a response does not match the
pattern in rcv, ST sends ⊥ to the querier. ST is single-threaded.
structure: List of (h,type(h), attr (h), credentials (h)), Kcorrupted ⊂ handles
phase setup:
if Ui /∈Room
rcv (Sent, (U,Ui, sid),FinishSetup) from FSIMT
enter run
else #if Ui ∈Room
rcv (New,sid, F, a) from Ui
if a=0 and (F=FPKE or F=FNonce) or (a>0 and F=KW)
generate fresh h
snd (Generate,sid) to F
rcv (Generate•,sid,cred) from F
save (h,F, a, cred)
snd (Generate•, sid, h) to Ui
rcv (Share, sid, (Ui, h1), (Uj , h2)) from Ui
if h1 is in List and U2 ∈ Room
snd (Send,(ST i,ST 2, sid), ((Uj , h2),type(h1),attr(h1),
credentials (h1))) to FSIMT
if rcv (Sent,(ST 2,ST i, sid),⊥) from FSIMT snd ⊥ to Ui
else snd (Share•,sid) to U1
rcv (Sent, (ST j ,ST i, sid),((U, h), type, a, cred)) from FSIMT
if h is not in List yet
add (h,type,a,cred) to List
snd (Send,(Ui, Uj , sid),OK)
else snd (Send,(Ui, Uj , sid),⊥) to FSIMT
rcv (FinishSetup) from any U
for any U ∈ Room
snd (Send,(Ui, U, sid), FinishSetup) to FSIMT
rcv (Sent,(U,Ui, sid), FinishSetup
•) to FSIMT
snd (FinishSetup•,sid) to U
enter phase run
rcv (Sent, (U,Ui, sid),FinishSetup) from FSIMT




rcv(New,sid, F, a) from Ui:
... #behave as in setup phase
rcv (AttributeChange,sid ,h,a new) from Ui:
if attr (h)=a new: snd (AttributeChange,sid) to Ui
else snd ⊥ to Ui
rcv (Wrap,sid,h1, h2,id) from Ui:
if attr (h1)=0 or attr(h1)≤attr(h2): snd ⊥
else # attrh(h1)≥1 and attr(h1)>attr(h2)
snd (Wrap, sid,sid(h1),credentials(h1),
<attr(h2),type(h2),id>,credentials(h2)) to FKW
rcv (Wrap•,wrap) from FKW;
snd (Wrap•,sid,(wrap,<attr(h2),type(h2),id>)) to Ui
rcv (Unwrap,sid,h,c, a, F, id)) from Ui:
if attr (h) ≥ 1 and attr(h) > a
snd (Unwrap,sid,credentials(h),<a,F,id>,c) to FKW;
rcv (Unwrap,sid,k) from FKW
generate fresh h ’; save (h’, F, a, k)
rcv (Command,sid,h,m) from Ui, Command ∈ Cj
if attr (h) 6=0 or h does not exist: snd ⊥ to Ui
else # attr(h)=0
snd (Command, sid, credentials(h),m) to Fj
rcv (Command•, sid, m) from Fj; snd (Command•, sid, m) to Ui
rcv (Corrupt,sid,(U,h)) from A
if U=Ui
snd (Corrupt•, sid, credentials(h)) to A; save corruption request for h
rcv (CorruptionStatus,sid,h) from Ui
if corruption request for h was saved
snd (CorruptionStatus•,sid,Corrupted) to U 
Listing 1.3. A security token ST i using FKW and FSIMT
We now show that ST implements the following static key-hierarchy policy. We
define this policy as the relation that consists of all 4-tuples (F ,Cmd,attr1,attr2)
such that the conditions in one of the lines in the following table hold. Note that
we omit the “=” sign when we mean equality and “*” denotes that no condition
has to hold for the variable.
F Cmd attr1 attr2
FKW New > 0 *
6= FKW New 0 *
* AttributeChange a a
FKW Wrap > 0 attr1 > attr2
FKW Unwrap > 0 attr1 > attr2
Fi C ∈ Ci 0 *
(where a ∈ N)
Cortier and Steel have shown that a policy enforcing a static key-hierarchy
can give the following guarantee: If an attacker leans a key of a certain security
level a (the attribute in our case), he might learn any data of security level
strictly smaller than a, but nothing more [CS09]. Transferring their result to our
framework remains ongoing work.
We can now state our UC-emulation theorem which is depicted in Figure 1.
Theorem 12. ST is secure with respect to any parameters (Φ,Φext,Room,F , Π),
where Π describes a static-key hierarchy.
Proof sketch. We prove that an invariant holds for all sequences of messages
that the environment sends to the network STNST,Φ,Φext,Room,F,Π as ST
F1...Fl .
Assuming that the invariant is preserved for a smaller sequence of messages, we
show that it is also preserved after the next message is processed. The heart
of the invariant is the consistency of the internal state of FKM and the “global
state” of the ST i, e. g., that for all internal indexes i = I(Ui, h) in FKM, we
have that, on ST i, credentials(i) and credentials(h) are equally distributed,
attr(i) = attr(h), and that FKM and all ST i ∈ Room leave the set-up phase
at the same time. We further need to preserve other properties, for example
that the internal states of the functionalities F1 . . .Fl in both worlds are equally
distributed and credentials of wrapping keys stay secret. An intuition why state
consistency holds is the following: The credentials and attributes are only written
by an (Unwrap) or by a (New) query. (New) is trivial to verify, so we look at
(Unwrap). FKW only allows (Unwrap, sid , h, a, c) if c has been produced by
a (Wrap, sid , h, a, m) query. By the fact that the internal handles of FKW
cannot be guessed and never leave the device, we can guarantee that query came
from an ST i. This means especially that the bound attribute a is the saved
attribute, so we can guarantee attr(i) = attr(h). Furthermore, by the fact that
the credentials constitute the message m, we can assure that the credentials are
drawn from the same distribution. Intuitively, if we assume the internal state of a
KU-functionality to be equally distributed in both worlds, we can conclude from
state consistency that every command for this KU-functionality behaves just the
same in both worlds, in particular since the credentials are equally distributed.
See Appendix B for the full proof. 
The Theorem specifies how to use key-wrapping to implement a key-hierarchy.
Due to its generality, it is simple to add new features to a Security API, such as
digital signatures, without having to prove anything about the interaction of the
new feature with other KU-functionalities. As long as the token’s key-management
is implemented according to ST , the proof does not need to be redone. In this
sense, Theorem 12 allows us to extend a token with arbitrary KU-functionalities
- as long as they can be implemented individually, which is the subject of the
next section.
We will briefly discuss the runtime of ST in detail. ST maintains a configura-
tion of size O(η ·q), where q is the number of keys stored, which is at most as large
as the number of New or Unwrap queries received so far. For each query received,
the configuration grows at most by the length of one entry in the database, i. e.,
by O(η), performs O(η) steps of computation (since a credential of length in
O(η) might be transmitted) and at most one subroutine-call (i. e.input to another
functionality) is made.
Note that the notion of polynomial-boundedness of a protocol does not
transfer well from one simulation-based security framework to another. This is
polynomial-time execution according to the definition in the IITM framework
[Ku¨s06], because the run-time per activation is bounded by a polynomial in the
security parameter, the current input size and the size of the current configuration,
while the runtime at any point of the execution is bounded by a polynomial
in the security parameter, and the length received on the input-channels to
the environment (which would be tagged as “enriching” in this framework). In
contrast, the definition in the UC framework requires the runtime at any point
of the execution to be bounded by a polynomial in n, where n is the sum of the
security parameter η, the number bytes input or output to sub-routines , and
nN · η (nN is the number of functionalities called, in our case at most l+ 2). This
means that the number of input bytes per query needs to be a polynomial in η,
since at most one sub-routine output is made per query. This can be reached by
altering the definition of FKM and ST such that 1η needs to be appended to
every incoming query, but is ignored. In fact, in the GNUC framework, this is
the case for every message transmitted [HS11], thus ST runs in polynomial-time
according to the definition in this framework.
4 Realizing key-usage functionalities
To demonstrate the usefulness of Theorem 12, we will equip a security token ST
as shown above with the functionalities F1 = FNonce and F2 = FSIG defined
below. The resulting security token STF
Nonce,FSIG is able to encrypt keys and
nonces and sign user-supplied data. It is not able to sign keys, as we consider
this task part of the key-management. We suppose that the symbolic results
in this paper can be transferred to STF
Nonce,FSIG without much effort, as by
Theorem 12, STF
Nonce,FSIG can realize key-management for {FNonce,FSIG } and
a static key-hierarchy policy. This allows for an easier analysis in the context of a
protocol. Formal methods could be employed: an approach of using abstractions
by UC functionalities to prove computational soundness is presented in [CH06].
It seems promising to derive a computational soundness result for the symbolic
model presented in [CS09]. The digital signature functionality is designed after
the one described in [KT08] and detailed in Listing 1.4.
params: L,M,Y #Leakage function domain of plaintexts,signatures
structure: K #set of generated keys
Kcorrupted ⊂ K, Kuncorrupted := K \ Kcorrupted
Signatures: K → 2M×Y
List : P ×K
Algorithms Sig, Ver
phase init:
rcv (Algorithms, sid , sig, ver) from A
Sig:=sig; Ver:=ver; enter phase run
phase run:
rcv (Generate, sid) from P
snd (Generate, sid) to A
rcv (KeyGenKey, sid , k := (sk , vk)) from A
ptr ← {0, 1}|k|
add (ptr , k) to List
snd (Generate•, sid , ptr) to P
rcv (VerificationKey,sid ,ptr)
search (ptr , (sk , vk)) ∈List
snd (VerificationKey•,sid ,vk) to P
rcv (Sign,sid , ptr ∈ P, m ∈M) from P
search (ptr , (sk , vk)) ∈List
σ ← Sig(sk ,m)
if Ver(vk ,m, σ)
save (m,σ) in Signatures(vk)
else σ ← ⊥
snd (Sign•,sid ,σ) to P
rcv(Verify, sid , ptr ∈ P, m, σ) from P
search (ptr , k = (sk , vk)) ∈List
b←Ver(vk ,m, σ)
if k /∈ Kcorrupted and b=1 and 6 ∃σ′ : (m,σ′) ∈Signatures(vk)
or b 6∈ {0, 1}
b← ⊥
snd (Verify•,sid ,b) to P
rcv(VerifyPublic,sid ,vk,m,σ)
search (ptr , k = (sk , vk)) ∈List




if b=1 and 6 ∃σ′ : (m,σ′) ∈Signatures(vk)
or b 6∈ {0, 1}
b← ⊥
snd (VerifyPublic•,sid ,b) to P
rcv(Corrupt,sid ,ptr) from A
if (ptr , k) ∈List
add k to Kcorrupted and save corruption request for ptr
rcv (CorruptionStatus,sid ,ptr) from Ui
if corruption request for ptr was saved
snd (CorruptionStatus•,sid ,Corrupted) to U
else snd ⊥ to U 
Listing 1.4. A signature functionality FSIG
Note that the functionality offers a command VerificationKey ∈ CSIG that
outputs the public part
of the key. Effectively, this means that when FSIG is used via FKM and a
user sends this command to FKM, using a handle that is of type FSIG, the output
contains the verification key. The function VerifyPublic then allows to verify
the validity of a signature for a given verification key, without knowledge of the
credential. In Section 5, we mention that future work could enable us to produce
an implementation IˆSIG such that IˆSIG≤UC FSIG from the proof presented in
[KT08] for a non-key-manageable signature functionality. Since this is out of the
scope of this work, we assume such a IˆSIG.
The FNonce is an unusual functionality, but demonstrates what can be done
within the design of FKM. It models the creation of nonces, tests of equality and
two kinds of corruption, one allowing him to learn the value of a nonce, and a
second one allows him to create a nonce that is equal to every other nonce, even
nonces that have not yet been created. FNonce might be used to model nonce
corruption through weak random number generators or investigate on nonce
generation via PRNGs, for example.
structure: List: P, Pcor ⊂ P
rcv(Generate, sid ) from any P:
h ← {0, 1}η
snd (Generate•, sid , h) to P
rcv(Equal, sid , h1, h2) for any P
if h1 = h2 or h1 ∈ Pcor or h2 ∈ Pcor then
snd (Equal•,sid ,YES) to P
else
snd (Equal•,sid ,NO) to P
rcv(Corrupt, sid ,h) from A
snd (Corrupt•, sid , h) to A
save corruption request for h
rcv(GenerateNonceGuess, sid) from A
h ← {0, 1}η
add h to Pcor
save corruption request for h
snd (GenerateNonceGuess•, sid , h) to A
rcv (CorruptionStatus,sid ,h) from Ui
if corruption request for h was saved
snd (CorruptionStatus•,sid ,Corrupted) to U
else snd ⊥ to U 
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Fig. 2. Simplified sketch of the chain of proofs to show that KU-functionalities can be
implemented.
Since it is established that STF
Nonce,FSIG UC-emulates FKM for FNonce and
FSIG, it is possible to obtain a number of properties in spirit of those proven
for a symbolic modelling of a static key-hierarchy policy in [CS09], since the
token STF
Nonce,FSIG provides similar cryptographic operations. Here, however,
we investigate how to realize KU-functionalities in general:
A proof technique to realize KU-functionalities Although Theorem 12 offers a
great deal of flexibility, the question arises whether the functionalities can be
realized in this context. Most notably, ST wraps credentials instead of keys, but
the environment sees credentials only in case of corruption. So, is it possible
to implement credentials with keys, knowing that the KU-functionalities are in
some sense protected by ST? We will introduce a proof technique permitting the
substitution of calls to a KU-functionality with a distributed implementation
that operates using keys instead of credentials. It is quite generic and allows us
to conclude under what circumstances an implementation of key-management
and cryptographic operations in a device UC-emulate FKM with a given set of
KU-functionalities. It is of further interest, because it gives an answer to the
question of how to abstract keys in simulation-based security frameworks like
UC.
For distributed Security APIs, the implementation of a KU-functionality F
cannot rely on any internal state other than the key. Therefore, we can safely
assume that a typical implementation consists of a key-generation algorithm KG
and an implementation implCmd for each command Cmd in the set of supported
commands C. When generating a new key, a Security API creates a key k ←
KG(1η) and stores it as if it were a credential. When processing a request
(Cmd, sid , h,m), assuming that h is a handle to k, the response is computed by
implCmd(k,m). To model a Secure API that makes this computations, we assume
it simulates the following implementation of the functionality locally:
Definition 13 (Local implementation). For a functionality F with com-
mands C, given KG and {implCmd}Cmd∈C, we define I as follows:
rcv(Generate,sid) from U
snd (Generate•, sid, k ← KG(1η)) to U
rcv (Command,sid,k,m) from U ,Command ∈ Cj
snd (Command•,sid,implCmd(k,m)) to U 
Listing 1.6. A generic implementation of a key-usage function, I
Given an ITM pi, we say that piF/I , i. e., pi where every subroutine call to F
is is substituted by a call to a locally simulated instance of I, is pi with a local
implementation of F by I.
From its definition we can see that STF/I can be implemented using only
function calls to the algorithms KG and {implCmd}Cmd∈C . It is clear that it is
typically impossible to directly UC-emulate F by I, since I exposes the key
generated by KG to the environment. A slight modification allows us to use
credentials instead of keys. Credentials need to be difficult to guess, but since
wrappings of credentials will be visible to the environment, we need to assure that
the distribution of length of credentials is similar to the distribution of length of
keys.
params: KG with domain K,implCmd for each Cmd ∈ C
structure: List: K ×K, Kcorrupted ⊂ K
rcv(Generate,sid) from U
save (k ← KG(1η), cred ← {0, 1}|k|) in List;
snd (Generate•,sid ,cred) to U
rcv (Cmd,sid,cred,m) from U , Cmd ∈ Cj
search (k,cred)∈ List; snd (Cmd•,sid ,implCmd(k,m)) to U
rcv (Corrupt,sid ,cred) from A
search (k,cred)∈ List; add k to Kcorrupted; snd (Corrupt•,sid ,k) to A
rcv (CorruptionStatus,sid ,cred) from U
search (k,cred)∈ List
if k ∈ Kcorrupted: snd (CorruptionStatus•,sid ,Corrupted) to P
else snd (CorruptionStatus•,sid ,Uncorrupted) to P 
Listing 1.7. Implementation of KU-function Iˆ
In the following, we will prove that if Iˆ implements a KU-functionality F , then
we can substitute calls to F by local computations as defined by I. In a way, this is
a reversed version of a joint state theorem, because we implement a functionality
with an internal state by distributing the computation across the ST is. The
proof will proceed in three steps which are depicted in Figure 2. Despite having
a globally readable register for which parties are corrupted, the UC framework
has nothing of the sort for corrupted keys. This is the reason why dealing with
key-corruption within UC is rather quirky: Usually, the implementation offers
a (Corrupt) query that exposes a key and can only be called by the adversary.
The functionality, when receiving the same query, adjusts its behaviour, usually
giving the simulator more power, e. g. in the case of encryption, it sends real
encryptions instead of fake once, accounting for the knowledge the adversary has
obtained. To assure that the simulator corrupts the same keys that the adversary
corrupts, a (CorruptionStatus) query allows the environment to see whether a
keys was corrupted. If it was not for such a query, many functionalities could be
emulated easily with a simulator that corrupts every key from the start.
Although a real Security API would never answer a (Corrupt) query, this
method works well to model corruption in case that the corruption of one key is
independent of the corruption of another. This is different in our case, here is an
example: Assume, a key k2 is wrapped using k1 and transferred from Security
API A to Security API B. Security API B now generates a key k3 and wraps it
with k2, and sends the wrapping to the environment. Now, assume the adversary
corrupts the handle (A,1) that points to k1. In the real world, the attacker learns
all the keys k1, k2, k3. Therefore, the corresponding credentials need to be given
to the simulator in the ideal world, but this requires registering which key is
wrapped with which key, which is impossible to do for this example, since A,
B and C do not have a communication channel except for the environment. To
overcome the lack of a global key-corruption register, we need to require that
the environment corrupts every key explicitly: Before a key is wrapped with a
corrupted key, it has to be corrupted itself.
We define this property with respect to the view of the environment E, i. e.,
the messages (m0,. . . ,mn) it sends or receives. Let E
t = (m0, . . . ,mt) denote the
t-prefix of E. Since the environment never addresses a party directly, we define
from(m) to be the identity of the party that sent the message either herself, or
was instructed by the environment to do so. to(m) is defined similarly. Now it
is possible to define the response to the ith message in E as responseEt(i) =
minj>i{from(mi) = to(mj) ∧ from(mj) = to(mi) ∧ 6 ∃k < i : response(k) = i} .
This assumes that there is a response to every query, i. e., in case of an error,
FKM responds with ⊥ rather than ignoring the query. In order to tell which
handles are corrupted, we need to define which handles point to the same key a
given moment t. Given En = (m0, . . . ,mn) we define ≡0 to be the empty relation
and for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n, we define ≡t as the least symmetric transitive relation such
that
1. ≡t⊂≡t−1 ∪{(U, h), (U, h)}, if mt = (Generate•, sid ,h), to(mt) = U and
∃s < t : ms = (New,sid ,F ,a,h) ∧from(ms) = U ∧responseEt(s) = t (for any
F and a)
2. ≡t⊂≡t−1 ∪ {(U1, h1),(U2, h2)}, if mt = (Share•,sid), to = U1 and ∃s < t :
ms =(Share,sid ,(U1, h1), (U2, h2)) ∧ from(ms) = U1 ∧ responseEt(s)= t
3. ≡t⊂≡t−1 ∪{(U1, h1), (U2, h2)}, if mt=(Unwrap•,sid),
h2), to(mt) = U2 and ∃q, r, s : responseEt(q) = r, responseEt(s) = t, r < s,
mq = (Wrap, sid , h1, h2, id), with from(mq) = U1, mr = (Wrap
•, sid , w),
with to(mr) = U1 and ms = (Unwrap, sid , h
′
1, w, a, type, id), from(ms) =U1
where (U2, h
′
1) ≡t−1 (U1, h1).
4. ≡t=≡t−1, otherwise.
By definition of FKM, during any execution of FKM and FKW with a view
Et, I(U, h) = I(U ′h′) in FKM iff (U, h) ≡t (U ′, h′). Using this relation, we can
define a corrupt handle predicate: corruptedEt(U, h) iff either some (U
∗, h∗),
((U∗, h∗) ≡t (U, h)) were corrupted directly, i. e., there are mi,mj ∈ Et such
that response (i) = j, from (mi) = A, and mi = (Corrupt, sid , (U∗, h∗)) and
mj = (Corrupt
•, sid , c) for some c, or via wrapping with a corrupted key, formally:
there are ei,mj ∈ Et such that response (i) = j, from (mi) = U1, and mi =
(Wrap, sid , h1, h2) and mj = (Wrap
•, sid , c) for some c, while (U1, h1) ≡t (U∗, h∗)
and (U1, h2) ≡t (U, h) for some (U∗, h∗) that were corrupted directly. We define
the event explicit-corruption to be the event that the view Et = (m0, . . .mt) of
the environment at the end of the execution fulfils the following predicate:
∀i ≤ t. mi = (Wrap, sid , h1, h2, id) ∧ from(mi) = U
∧ corruptedEi(U, h1)⇒ corruptedEi(U, h2)
Intuitively, this predicate holds if the attacker never uses a corrupt key to
wrap an uncorrupted key, i. e., the attacker needs to explicitly corrupt a key in
order to wrap it with another corrupted key.
Now we show how to substitute a KU-functionality used of several instances
by ST with a local implementation I running on all ST individually.
Theorem 14. Given the implementation of keymanagement ST from Defini-
tion 11 with parameters (Φ,Φext,Room,F , Π), let STF/I be ST with a local imple-
mentation of F ∈ F by I. If (i) Iˆ UC-emulates F and (ii) Pr[k = k′|k′ ← KG(1η)]
is negligible for all k in the domain of KG, then, STNST,Φ,Φext,Room,F∪Iˆ,Π UC-
emulates STNSTF/I ,Φ,Φext,Room,F,Π under condition explicit-corruption.
Proof. In the following, we will abreviate STNSTF/I ,Φ,Φext,Room,F∪Iˆ,Π by pi
l,
and STNST,Φ,Φext,Room,F,Π by pi
r. Note that, in pil, the external dummy users
ϕ ∈ Φext have subroutine access to Iˆ like to any other KU-functionality.
from pil to p˜i1: The network p˜i1 functions as an intermediate step. It is pil,
but with ST instead of STF/calI , each adressing the same machine running I
via sub-routine tapes when F should be adressed. When Sim is supposed to
address I for the environment, Sim acts as if it were not present, since it cannot
be addressed in the real-world, either. Since I does not have any internal state,
there is no difference in the output of ST
F/I
i simulating I, and ST i calling the
machine I in the network. Since no other party is able to address I, there is no
environment E that can distinguish between the two networks The second step is
more involved:
from p˜i1 to p˜i2 In this transition, we will abstract keys by credentials. p˜i2 is
defined like p˜i1, but ST accesses Iˆ instead of I, just like the external dummy
users.On that account, we define Sim as follows: It runs D with the following
exception. When Sim is instructed to send (Corrupt,sid ,h) to some ST i, it
first requests the corresponding credential, i. e., sends (Corrupt,sid ,h) to ST i.
It obtains cred from ST i. Then, Sim sends (Corrupt,sid ,cred) to Iˆ, to obtain
the response (Corrupt•, sid , k) and forwards it to E . Sim adds (cred , k) to a
list of corrupted credentials and corresponding keys. When E instructs Sim
to send a (CorruptionStatus) command to Iˆ, it ignores this message, as A
does not answer this response in the real world. When FKW sends the query
(Wrap,sid ,ptr ,k,a,cred) to Sim, Sim substitutes cred by a k that was recorded
as (cred , k) while processing a corruption request. It sends (Wrap,sid ,ptr ,k,a, k)
to the environment and forwards the response back to FKW.
In order to show that for all E , EXECE,D,p˜i1 cannot be distinguished from
EXECE,Sim,p˜i2 , we will show that throughout the execution, p˜i2 and Sim provide
a perfect simulation of p˜i1 and D, as long as the mapping from credentials to
keys in Iˆ is a bijection. Assuming that this is the case, we note that the only
output that depends on some credentials(h∗) and is visible to the environment
is the response to (a) a (Wrap,sid ,h1,h
∗,id) query, (b) a (Command,sid ,h∗,m)
query, and (c) a corruption request (Corrupt,sid ,h∗) by the adversary. In case
(a) we know that h1 is a handle to a wrapping key, as otherwise ST would
not respond in either execution. The output is a wrapping that, by definition
of FKW, contains a random string of the length as credentials(h∗), in case
credentials(h1) are in Kuncorrupted in FKW. Both credential and key are of
the same length (by definition of Iˆ), so the output is equally distributed. It is
not possible to exploit that credentials(h∗) is now stored in Encryptions(k) in
FKW, since the (Unwrap) query that FKW provided can not be accessed directly,
unless credentials(h1) was corrupted. (Recall that, by the definition of FKM,
FKW 6∈ {F1, . . . ,Fl}.) So, if it is called via (Unwrap), no output is produced, the
credentials are stored instead.
In case that credentials(h1) is in Kcorrupted in FKW, we know that the
environment must have asked some U to corrupt a handle that points to this
credential, as the credential is needed to corrupt a key in FKW, and the credentials
to FKW are difficult to guess. Therefore, since we regard only executions that
fulfil the conditions of explicit-corruption, some (U ′, h′) ≡ (U, h∗) must have been
corrupted explicitly. Hence, Sim has an entry (cred , k) such that k is the key
matching the credential for h∗. Sim forwards (Wrap,sid ,ptr ,k,a,k) for the correct
k to the environment, just a D does in pˆi1. A correct simulation in case (b) is
assured by the fact that Iˆ substitutes the credential with the corresponding key
before executing implCommand, assuming that the List maintained in Iˆ describes a
bijection between credentials and keys. Therefore, in both executions, the output
is implCommand(k,m), where k is the key that was drawn using KG and bound
to the credential. Case (c) works similarly: Assuming the bijection, by definition
of Sim, the environment will receive the key that was created along with the
credential. By the assumption that Pr[k = k′|k′ ← KG(1η)] is negligible for all k,
we know that the probability that every k and cred generated in Iˆ is distinct,
because the length of this list is bound by the running time of the environment,
which is polynomial in η. Thus, the mapping from credentials to keys constitutes
a bijection. We note further that the external dummy users in Φext can adress
the same parties as before, but now Iˆ stores, in addition to the credentials and
keys the dummy user generate, the credentials and keys ST generates. Again
by the assumption that Pr[k = k′|k′ ← KG(1η)], we see the probability of an
interference of those two groups of parties in Iˆ are negligible. This concludes
the proof that EXECE,D,p˜i1 can only be distinguished from EXECE,Sim,p˜i2 with
negligible probability.
from p˜i2 to STF1...Fl This follows from the composition theorem provided by
the UC framework, and the assumption that Iˆ UC-emulates F . (Note that I
and F are subroutine respecting, since they do not adress any sub-parties.
To conclude, we summarize in Corollary 15 which assumptions have to be
met by an implementation of ST , FKW and the KU-functionalities in order to
form a fully functional Security API that UC-emulates FKM.
Corollary 15. A local implementation STF1/I1,...,Fl/Il,F
KW/piKW of the Security
Token described in Definition 11, is secure under condition explicit-corruption ∪
corrupt-before-wrap, with respect to any parameters (Φ,Φext,Room,F1, . . . ,Fl, Π),
if:
– Π describes a static-key hierarchy,
– for i ∈ F1, . . . ,Fl, I˜i UC-emulates Fi, and Pr[k = k′|k′ ← KG(1η)] is
negligible for all k in the domain of KG, the key-generation used in Ii,
– during the set-up phase, there is a secure channel to realize the secure instan-
taneous message transfer functionality FSIMT,
– KW is a symmetric encryption scheme secure with respect to Definition 18 .
Proof. Because of lack of space we only sketch this proof which is basically a
consequence of Theorems 12, 14 and Theorem 16. Let the network pil consist of the
functionalities F˜ key-wrapping functionality FKW and Ui ∈ U , each connected to
a ST
F1/I1,...,Fl/Il
i with Ui and Room as parameters. Then, from the transitivity of
UC-emulation, Theorem 12 and by inductive application of Theorem 14, it follows
that the network pil UC-emulates {FKM,FKW,F1. . .Fl}. Carefully verifying that,
by definition of ST and corrupt-before-wrap, the composition theorem can be
applied, we substitute FKW with pˆiKW . Finally, the proof that pˆiKW can be
locally implemented by piKW according to Definition 1.6 is exactly the proof to
Theorem 14, except that it is not necessary anymore to deal with case (a) in the
second step ( pˆi1 to pˆi2).
5 Conclusions
We have presented a provably secure framework for key management in the UC
model. It would be interesting to extend FKM allow policies to have side-effects.
For example, the attribute of a wrapping key or the pay-load key might be altered
when wrapping, so a high-security wrapping key could only be used so many
times. A number of policies could be implemented to see what security properties
they induced and who much they restrict the use of a Security API. In further
work, we are currently also developing a technique for transforming functionalities
that use keys but are not key-manageable into key-manageable functionalities
with implementations in the style of Listing 1.7. This way, existing proofs could
be used to develop a secure implementation of cryptographic primitives in a
plug-and-play manner. Investigating the restrictions of this approach could teach
us more about the modelling of keys in simulation-based security.
References
BA01. M. Bond and R. Anderson. API level attacks on embedded systems. IEEE
Computer Magazine, pages 67–75, October 2001.
BCFS10. Matteo Bortolozzo, Matteo Centenaro, Riccardo Focardi, and Graham Steel.
Attacking and fixing PKCS#11 security tokens. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS’10), Chicago,
Illinois, USA, October 2010. ACM Press. To appear.
BDHK07. Michael Backes, Markus Du¨rmuth, Dennis Hofheinz, and Ralf Ku¨sters. Con-
ditional reactive simulatability. International Journal of Information Security
(IJIS), 2007.
Can01. Ran Canetti. Universally composable security: A new paradigm for crypto-
graphic protocols. In 42nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science, pages 136–145, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, October 2001. IEEE Com-
puter Society Press.
Can05. Ran Canetti. Universally composable security: A new paradigm for crypto-
graphic protocols. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2000/067, December
2005. Updated version of [Can01] http://eprint.iacr.org/.
CC09. C. Cachin and N. Chandran. A secure cryptographic token interface. In
Proc. 22th IEEE Computer Security Foundation Symposium (CSF’09), pages
141–153. IEEE Comp. Soc. Press, 2009.
CCA06. CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide, October 2006. Available online at
http://www-03.ibm.com/security/cryptocards/pdfs/bs327.pdf.
CDNO97. Ran Canetti, Cynthia Dwork, Moni Naor, and Rafail Ostrovsky. Deniable
encryption. In Burton S. Kaliski Jr., editor, CRYPTO, volume 1294 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 90–104. Springer, 1997.
CH06. Ran Canetti and Jonathan Herzog. Universally composable symbolic analysis
of mutual authentication and key exchange protocols. In In Proceedings,
Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC, pages 380–403. Springer, 2006.
CHK04. Ran Canetti, Shai Halevi, and Jonathan Katz. Adaptively-secure, non-
interactive public-key encryption. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/317,
2004. http://eprint.iacr.org/.
CKS07. V. Cortier, G. Keighren, and G. Steel. Automatic analysis of the security of
XOR-based key management schemes. In O. Grumberg and M. Huth, editors,
Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems (TACAS),
number 4424 in LNCS, pages 538–552, 2007.
CS09. Ve´ronique Cortier and Graham Steel. A generic security API for symmetric
key management on cryptographic devices. In Proc. 14th European Symposium
on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS’09), volume 5789 of LNCS,
pages 605–620. Springer, 2009.
DKS10. Ste´phanie Delaune, Steve Kremer, and Graham Steel. Formal analysis
of PKCS#11 and proprietary extensions. Journal of Computer Security,
18(6):1211–1245, November 2010.
DN00. Ivan B. Damg˚ard and Jesper Buus Nielsen. Improved non-committing encryp-
tion schemes based on a general complexity assumption. pages 433–451, 2000.
RS-00-6.
Hof08. Dennis Hofheinz. Possibility and impossibility results for selective de-
commitments. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2008/168, 2008. http:
//eprint.iacr.org/.
HS11. Dennis Hofheinz and Victor Shoup. Gnuc: A new universal composability
framework. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2011/303, 2011. http://
eprint.iacr.org/.
KKS12. Steve Kremer, Robert Ku¨nnemann, and Graham Steel. Universally composable
keymanagement (full version). available online: http://internet.fr/datei.
txt, 2012.
KSW11. Steve Kremer, Graham Steel, and Bogdan Warinschi. Security for key man-
agement interfaces. In Proceedings of the 24th IEEE Computer Security
Foundations Symposium (CSF’11), pages 66–82. IEEE Comp. Soc. Press,
2011.
KT08. Ralf Ku¨sters and Max Tuengerthal. Joint State Theorems for Public-Key
Encryption and Digitial Signature Functionalities with Local Computation. In
Proc. 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF’08), pages
270–284. IEEE Comp. Soc. Press, 2008.
KT11. Ralf Ku¨sters and Max Tuengerthal. Ideal Key Derivation and Encryption in
Simulation-Based Security. In Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA’11, volume
6558 of LNCS, pages 161–179. Springer, 2011.
Ku¨s06. R. Ku¨sters. Simulation-Based Security with Inexhaustible Interactive Turing
Machines. In Proc. 19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop
(CSFW’06), pages 309–320. IEEE Comp. Soc. Press, 2006.
LR92. D. Longley and S. Rigby. An automatic search for security flaws in key
management schemes. Computers and Security, 11(1):75–89, March 1992.
MR11. Ueli Maurer and Renato Renner. Abstract cryptography. In Proc. 2nd Sym-
posium in Innovations in Computer Science (ICS’11), pages 1–21. Tsinghua
University Press, 2011.
RS06. P. Rogaway and T. Shrimpton. Deterministic authenticated encryption: A
provable-security treatment of the keywrap problem, 2006.
RSA04. RSA Security Inc., v2.20. PKCS #11: Cryptographic Token Interface Standard,
June 2004.
TCG07. Trusted Computing Group. TPM Specification version 1.2. Parts 1–3, re-
vision 103. http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/tpm_main_
specification, 2007.
Tse07. Yuh-Min Tseng. An efficient two-party identity-based key exchange protocol.
Informatica, 18:125–136, January 2007.
A FKW and the commitment problem
In FKM, as well as in the proposed implementation of a Security API, ST , we
rely on the key-wrapping functionality FKW. Due to the commitment problem,
it is not possible to realize this functionality under dynamic corruption of keys,
therefore FKM is not realizable in this form. This following section will explain
the commitment problem and explain out the difference of dynamic corruption in
the context of Security APIs to the traditional understanding. It will furthermore
show how to realize FKW using an existing definition of wrapping schemes from
[KSW11] for all runs where the commitment problem does not occur.
We build on a definition for deterministic, authenticated wrapping-schemes,
going back to the original work by Rogaway and Shrimpton [RS06] which has been
adapted to a multi-user setting and to allow key-dependant messages in [KSW11].
We further generalised it to allow the same key to be encrypted several times with
different attributes. This is necessary in our work, because we support attribute
changes, therefore a key can have different attributes on different machines. A
leakage function serves as a parameter in FKW. It determines the amount of
information about the message that is ideally given to the wrapping algorithm.
Typically, it outputs a random string with a length that depends on the length
of the message, the key, and the bound attribute. FKW is detailed in Listing 1.8.
We chose deterministic encryption because it is used in most hardware tokens,
and because we can show that it is possible to implement FKW using a key-
wrapping scheme as described in Definition 17 in [KSW11]. The security FKM
provides depends on the authenticity and secrecy provided by FKW, however,
FKW can easily be modified to define probabilistic encryption, by not performing
the test ’‘If there is c*” after reception of a message (Wrap,sid ,. . . ), but jumping
directly into the else branch. It would be interesting to investigate how asymmetric
encryption schemes could be used here, but this is out of the scope of this work.
params: X ,K ⊂ X ,H,Y #message−,key−,attribute− and ciphertext space
P #distribution of pointers, with support disjoint from X
#requirement: ∀p ∈ support(P) : Pr[p← P] is negligible
L : H×K×X → Y #Leakage function
structure: Kcorrupted ⊂ K, Kuncorrupted := K \ Kcorrupted
List : P ×K
Encryptions: K → 2(H×M×Y) #Encryptions under key k
Algorithms: Wrap·(·, ·) : H×K×X → Y, Unwrap·(·, ·) : H×K× T → X
corruption graph (K, ∅)
The sid is checked (as below), but has no structure
phase init:
rcv (Algorithms, sid , wrap, unwrap) from A
Wrap:=wrap; Unwrap:=unwrap; enter phase run
phase run:
rcv (Generate, sid) from P
snd (KeyGen, sid) to A; rcv (KeyGenKey, sid , k ∈ K) from A
ptr ← P; add (ptr ,k) to List
snd (Generate•, sid , ptr) to P
rcv (Wrap,sid , ptr ∈ P,a ∈ H,m ∈ X ∪ P) from P
search k such that (ptr ,k) in List
if there is c∗ such that (a,m,c∗) in Encryptions(k)
snd (Wrap•,sid , c∗) to P
else if k∈ Kcorrupted
if m ∈ P and there is k’ such that (m, k’) in List
add edge k, k′ in corruption graph
for all k′′ reachable from k′ in corruption graph
add k′′ to Kcorrupted
snd (Wrap,sid ,ptr ,k,a,k′) to A
else
snd (Wrap,sid ,ptr ,k,a,m) to A
rcv (Wrap•,sid ,c) from A
else # if k∈ Kuncorrupted
if m ∈ P
search k’ such that (ptr’, k’) in List
add edge k, k′ in corruption graph
c:= Wrapa(k, La(k, k′))
else if m ∈ X
c:= Wrapa(k, La(k,m))
save (a,m,c) in Encryptions(k)
snd (Wrap•,sid , c) to P
rcv (Unwrap,sid ,ptr ∈ P,a ∈ H,c ∈ Y) from P
search k such that (ptr , k) in List
if k∈ Kuncorrupted
if there is an m such that (a, m, c) in Encryptions(k)
snd (Unwrap•,sid , m) to P # either pointer or message
else snd ⊥ to P
else #k∈ Kcorrupted
m = Unwrapa(k, c)
if there is k’ such that (m, k’) in List
snd (Unwrap•,sid , k’) to P
else if m∈ K: snd (Unwrap•,sid , m) to P
rcv (Corrupt,sid ,ptr ∈ P) from A
search k such that (ptr,k) in List
for all k′ reachable from k in corruption graph
add k′ to Kcorrupted
save corruption request for ptr
rcv (CorruptionStatus,sid ,ptr ∈ P) from P
if corruption request for ptr was saved
snd (CorruptionStatus•,sid ,Corrupted) to U
else snd ⊥ to U 
Listing 1.8. A key-wrapping Functianality FKW
In Appendix C we show that a wrapping scheme as described in [KSW11]
can be used to realize this functionality, but only when the environment does not
corrupt keys which have been used to encrypt before. We avoid the commitment
problem by only regarding executions where a key is never corrupted after it has
been used to encrypt. Given the view Et = (m0, . . . ,mt) of the environment we
define the event corrupt-before-wrap to be the following predicate :
∀i ≤ t. corruptedEt(U, h) ∧mi = (Wrap, sid , h, h′)
∧ from(mi) = U ⇒ corruptedEi(U, h)
We state the Theorem here. Both the proof and Definitions 17 and 18 can be
found in Appendix C.
Theorem 16. If a symmetric encryption scheme KW = (KG,Wrap,UnWrap)
is secure with respect to Definition 18, then for the protocol version pˆiKW (see
Definition 17), pˆiKW UC-emulates FKW under the condition corrupt-before-wrap.
The interesting part of key-management is dynamic corruption: We would like
to know what guarantees we can give in case an attacker learns one or more keys
during the protocol run. As opposed to static corruption, an attacker can corrupt
a key after it has been used. What does this mean in case of encryption? For one,
it means that the attacker is not able to distinguish ideally encrypted ciphertexts
from actual encryptions of messages, hence, that he does not learn anything
about past encryptions after corruption of a key. This idea bears resemblance to
the notion of (perfect) forward secrecy, [Tse07].
However, this property is not needed, in fact, implementations thereof are
impractical in the domain of Security APIs. The question of why we are interested
in dynamic corruption arises. A small example, the encryption functionality F toy,
illustrates that the modelling of dynamic corruption is of interest, although
forward-secrecy is not a security goal. It furthermore shows where encryption
in connection with dynamic corruption produces a situation where existing
frameworks for simulation-based security prove to be useless - the so-called
commitment problem. F toy has a master and a slave key. The corruption of the
master key leads to the corruption of the slave key, but not vice versa. In reality,
the slave key might have been derived from the master key in some deterministic
way, maybe using a hash function.
phase init: #receive algorithms enc, dec and kmaster, kslave from A
phase run:
rcv (Enc, key∈ {master, slave}, m) from U:




rcv (Dec, key∈ {master, slave}, c) from U:
if corrupt(key), snd (Decryption,dec(kkey,c)) to U
else if (m,c) saved
snd (Decryption,m) to U
rcv (Corrupt, key∈ {master)
if key=master, set corrupt(master) and corrupt(slave)
else set corrupt(slave)
[...] 
Listing 1.9. A toy example of an encryption system F toy
Imagine an implementation of F toy, say pi. Let E send a number of (Enc, k,mi)
queries, and receive something that looks like encryptions. The simulator Sim
does, by definition of F toy, not learn the messages mi. The environment sees a
number of encryptions of the null-string. Now, upon corruption of k, the simulator
has to produce a key that allows to open the emitted encryptions to the messages
mi. If we assume some bound b(n) on the length of the key, i. e., the cardinality
of the key space is at most 2b(n). Still, the environment can produce random
messages of a total length greater than b(n). Therefore, there is no key that
would open the encryptions independent of the value of mi to the correct values
upon corruption.
[Hof08] shows the impossibility of a realization of selective decommitment.
This means that encryption needs to be non-committing to work in the setting
of dynamic corruption, so it is possible to circumvent this problem, but at the
cost of of having to updating the key regularly [CHK04], having a key-size larger
than the message space [CDNO97] or require interaction with the receiver to
communicate[DN00]. All of this is impractical for our purposes, as encryption in
Security APIs is typically needed to not be efficient for a possibly large number
of messages encrypted with the same key, without on-line communication to
the recipient. This is the scenario we have to deal with. We would like to use
traditional, efficient encryption systems.
While practical considerations make realizing F toy more difficult in this
regard, they are forgiving in another: In F toy, we do not mind if an intruder
learns about the content of already produced ciphertexts when corrupts the slave
key. But we do want to assure that past and future ciphertexts generated using
the master key stay secret - in contrast to the idea of forward secret encryption.
Unfortunately, it seems that we are not able to express non-forward secure
encryption in existing simulation-based security frameworks. In our opinion, this
is a problem of expressiveness: we cannot formulate our weaker notion of dynamic
key-corruption in, e. g., UC.
Existing work circumvents the problem in two ways. The first option is to use a
game-based definition instead simulation-based security, see for example [KSW11].
There, the attacker tries to distinguish real encryptions from fake encryption and
is constraint by a number of rules, to avoid what are called “trivial attacks”. In
this particular case, there are five kinds of request the adversary is not allowed
to make. It is very difficult to say whether any of those constraints forbids more
than just “trivial attacks”. The attacker has to choose which key to attack before
the experiment. It is not clear whether this is a restriction. Since Security APIs
are supposed to be used in other protocols, composability is a big issue. It is
not clear how Security APIs behave when used in several protocols at once, so a
proof by reduction to the game-based definition is necessary. The second option
is conditional simulatability, i. e., an implementation is proven to UC-realize F toy
or FKW for a restricted set of environments E , most often for all E that do not
corrupt keys that have been used to encrypt before corruption. Theorem 16 shows
a similar property. Although this approach benefits from some advantages of
simulation-based security, it turns out to be insufficient for Security APIs. The
restriction on the environment may hold for most protocols, still, when a party
that uses a Security API becomes corrupted, it is impossible to guarantee that
it corrupts the key before it uses it to encrypt. We aim at using Security APIs
as building blocks in arbitrary protocols to allow for secure execution of the
protocol despite corrupted parties, so conditional simulatability does not solve
the problem, either.
We conclude that a new framework is needed that allows to use non-forward
secure encryption in a composable setting with dynamic corruption by allowing
to express that encrypted messages must remain secure until a key is corrupted,
but not necessarily longer. A framework that could conserve the nice properties of
simulation-based security(intuitiveness, composability) would be of great benefit.
Furthermore, we suspect that this kind of “weak” dynamic corruption might turn
out to be equal to static corruption.
In the full version of the paper [KKS12] we prove that a deterministic authen-
ticated symmetric key-wrapping scheme KW = (KG,Wrap,UnWrap), as defined
by Kremer et al. [KSW11] can be transformed into a protocol version pˆiKW that
UC-emulates FKW under the condition corrupt-before-wrap.
B The Full Proof of Theorem 12
Theorem 12. ST is secure with respect to any parameters (Φ,Φext,Room,F , Π),
where Π describes a static-key hierarchy.
Proof. In the following, we will abbreviate FKM−Net(Φ,Φext,Room,F,Π) by FKM−Net
and STNST,Φ,Φext,Room,F,Π by STN. We have to show that there is a simulator
Sim, such that for all environments E , Pr[EXECSTN,D,E = 1] - Pr[EXECFKM−Net,Sim,E =
1] is negligible. Since the environment can access the Secure Tokens through the
dummy users Φ, it does not need to corrupt them. The Security APIs themselves
are assumed to be tamper-resistant. Technically, if D corrupts a dummy user ϕi
(which is stateless), E can instruct it to send messages to other parties than ST i,
but other ST j , j 6= i will respond with ⊥. Therefore, when Sim is instructed by
the environment to send something on behalf of the corrupted user Ui in the
ideal world, it will return ⊥ if it is addressed to ST j for j 6= i. If the message is
addressed to ST i, Sim will append the string by(Ui) to the message. By definition
of FKM, this is will be treated as if the message were coming from the dummy
party for Ui, therefore we conclude that, without loss of generality, we can assume
that E never corrupts any U ∈ U . Aside from the behaviour we specified, Sim
behaves like D, e. g., it might forward messages to the KU-functionalities.
Before proving the claim formally, we introduce some notation: When we talk
about internal variables of functionalities or protocols, we subscript the variable
with the entity it belongs to whenever we need to disambiguate them. For example,
credentials(i)FKM denotes the credentials for index i in the key-management
functionality, and not the credentials inside a secure token.
Invariant As soon as to(mk) has finished processing mk, the following holds for
all sequences of messages (m0,. . . ,mk) the environment sends or receives via the
dummy users or the adversary:
– state consistency : For all users Uj and handles h: If i = I(Uj , h) is defined
on FKM, then (a) credentials(i)FKM and credentials(h)ST j are equally
distributed and (b) attr(Uj , h)FKM = attr(h)ST j . If I(Uj , h) is undefined,
then no entry with h as first element exists in ListKMF . A corruption request
for (Uj , h) is recorded on ST j iff and only iff a corruption request for (Uj , h)
is recorded on FKM.
– phase consistency: FKM and all STi ∈ Room are in the same phase.
– secrecy of uncorrupted wrapping credentials: If, attr(Uj , h)FKM = 0, c =
credentials(I(Uj , h)) and there is [(ptr , k) ∈ List s.t. k ∈ Kuncorrupted]FKW
, then, the output of ST j and FKM is independent of c.
– output consistency: The distribution of all messages received by the environ-
ment is the same in the real execution and the ideal execution
– consistency of functionalities: F1 . . .Fl and FKW have equally distributed
states in both the real execution and the ideal execution
Initial step: For the empty sequence, i. e., prior to all messages sent by the
environment, the state of all ST i is empty, as well as the state of FKM, and they
are in the init phase. Furthermore, no message is output to the environment, and
the functionalities did not receive any messages yet, therefore we conclude that
the invariant is preserved.
Induction step Now assume that the invariant holds after messages (m0, . . . ,mk−1).
The environment sends a message mk. Case distinction:
Case: to(mk) ∈ {F1 · · ·Fl}: (Only A and the external dummy users in Φext can
address the KU-functionalities.) Neither state, nor phase of FKM and any ST are
affected, thus state consistency and phase hold. Both FKM and the ST i ignore
messages coming from the functionalities, except while processing a Command
∈ C. Consistency of functionalities and output consistency is preserved, because
the functionalities are equal in both worlds and receive the same input. Hence,
consistency of functionalities follows from the induction hypothesis.
Case: to(mk) = ST i and phase set-up
– m=(New,sid,F,a) while (F=FKW and a>0 ) or (F∈ {F1 · · ·Fl} and a = 0)
The same sequence of commands is sent to F in both executions. By con-
sistency of functionalities in the previous proof step, and the fact that F
runs the same code in both worlds, we can assure consistency of function-
alities. The credentials output by F are saved in credentials(i)FKM and
credentials(h)ST i , respectively. By state consistency in the previous step,
and since F receives the same commands in both instances, the distribution
of the credentials is equal. Thus, state consistency holds. Attributes are stored
correctly. Output and phase consistency, as well as secrecy of uncorrupted
wrapping credentials, hold trivially.
– m=(Share,sid,(Ui, h1),(Uj , h2)) and Ui =recipient(m) For this case we have
to look into the details of the scheduling of messages in the UC-model. When
a message is sent on a direct channel, the next program called is the code that
processes the message. This is why the message sent via FSIMT to ST j is pro-
cessed before the environment can send any further messages. By inspection
of the messages sent and the fact that FSIMT guarantees authenticity, we see
that credentials, attributes and types are correctly transferred between ST i
and ST j , thus state consistency holds.
If I(Uj , h2)
KM
F is undefined or there is no List entry for h in ST j , {0, 1} is
output, otherwise (Share,sid). By state consistency, those two events coincide,
i. e., in both networks the same is output, thus output consistency holds. The
phase is not changed, so the invariant holds in this case.
Case: to(mk) = ST i and phase “run” Once in phase “run”, no phase change takes
place anymore in every FKM and ST i, therefore phase consistency holds for any
m.
– m=(New,sid,F,h,a) The handling of this message is defined just as in the
set-up phase, and since the invariant is independent of the phase we are in
(except for phase consistency, of course, but we just dealt with this) , the
argument is literally the same as for the same message in the set-up phase.
– m=(AttributeChange,sid,h,a new) The condition in ST i implements the
policy relation, therefore the invariant transfers easily.
– m=(Wrap,sid,h1, h2,id) State consistency holds trivially by the fact that
neither credentials, nor attributes are touched. Therefore, the wrapping
functionality FKW receives the same messages in both worlds and is, by
consistency of functionalities in the previous proof step, in the same state
in both worlds at the end of its processing of the message. Thus consistency
of functionalities holds, and by the fact that the response is forwarded in
the same manner, output consistency holds as well. Since FKW only outputs
the message to be wrapped iff the wrapping keys is corrupted, we can assure
secrecy of uncorrupted wrapping credentials. If the handles h1 or h2 are not
defined, by state consistency, both FKM and ST i output ⊥.
– m=(Unwrap,sid,h,c, a, F, id)
• I(Uj , h)FKM not defined, or policy(FKW,Unwrap, [attr(I(U, h))]FKM , a)
= false Due to state consistency, in both worlds ⊥ is output and nothing
else, thus the invariant is preserved.
• FKW returns ⊥ to the query (Unwrap,sid, credentials(I(U, h), <a ,
type, id>,w). by state consistency, the query equals the query (Unwrap,sid ,
credentials(h), <a,type,id>,w) emitted by ST i, hence, by consistency
of functionalities, ST i receives ⊥, too. Therefore, both respond with ⊥.
• otherwise: In FKM a new handle is created, and I(U, h) updated to either
point to a newly generated key-index, or to one already in place with
the same credentials and attributes. In both cases, ST i creates a new
handle and stores it along credential, type and attribute in the list. Hence,
state consistency holds. Secrecy of uncorrupted wrapping credentials and
output consistency follow from the fact that no output is produced except
on the secret channel to FKW. Consistency of functionalities follows from
the fact that the same unwrap command is sent to FKW in both cases,
and that the credentials are equal by state consistency from the previous
proof step.
– m=(Cmd,sid,h,m) No internal state is changed, the message is directly for-
warded, so phase consistency and state consistency hold. Because FKW 6∈
{F1, . . . ,Fl}, the output is independent of each wrapping credential, so se-
crecy of uncorrupted wrapping credentials is preserved. State consistency
guarantees that the same message to F is computed. Since consistency of
functionalities in the previous proof step can be assumed, and key-manageable
functionalities are caller-independent (see Definition 4) , we conclude con-
sistency of functionalities for this step. Output consistency follows, because
both ST j and FKM only forward the output of F .
– m=(Corrupt,sid,(Uj , h)) By state consistency, the response is distributed
equally in real and ideal execution, hence output consistency holds, and
because the output is either ⊥ or depends only on the value of a corrupted
credential, secrecy of corrupted credentials is guaranteed as well. Neither
changes its internal state, except for the register of corruption request: the
corruption request for (Uj , h) is recorded on ST j as well as on FKM if I(Uj , h)
and (h, credentials(h)) are defined, which coincides by state consistency
of the previous step. Therefore, state consistency holds for the next step.
The message is addressed to the adversary only, so we have consistency of
functionalities.
– m=(CorruptionStatus,sid,(U,h)) By state consistency, the response is the
same in the real and the ideal execution. No internal state is changed, therefore,
the invariant holds for this step.
– m is none of the above FKM and ST i output ⊥.
C FKW Can Be Implemented Using Deterministic
Authenticated Encryption with Key-Dependant
Security
In the following we describe a Key-wrapping functionality and show that it can
be implemented using a deterministic authenticated encryption scheme as defined
in [RS06].
Definition 17. Given KW =(KG,Wrap,UnWrap), we define the protocol version
pˆiKW as follows:
params: KW = (KG,Wrap,Unwrap), distribution of pointers P
structure: List of {0, 1}η × keys
phase init:
rcv (Algorithms, sid, wrap, unwrap) from A
enter phase run
phase run:
rcv (Keygen, sid) from P
save (ptr ← P, k ← KG(1η)) in List
snd (KeyPointer, sid, ptr) to P
rcv (Wrap,sid, ptr,a, m) from P
search k such that (ptr,k) in List
if m ∈ P
search (m,k’) in List
snd (Wrap•, Wrapak(k
′)) to P
else snd (Wrap•, Wrapak(m)) to P
rcv (Unwrap,sid, ptr,a,c) from P
search k such that (ptr,k) in List
snd (Unwrap•, Unwrapak(c)) to P
rcv (Corrupt,sid,ptr) from A
search k such that (ptr,k) in List
save corruption request for ptr
snd (Corrupt•,sid,k) to A
rcv (CorruptionStatus,sid,ptr ∈ P) from P
if corruption request for ptr was saved
snd (CorruptionStatus,sid,Corrupted) to U
else snd ⊥ to U 
Listing 1.10. pˆiKW given KG,Wrap,UnWrap
We repeat the definition of from [KSW11] here. It is based on the notion of
deterministic, authenticated encryption from [RS06], but it additionally supports
key-dependant messages. We changed the definition, so it allows to wrap the
same key with the same wrapping key but under different attributes, just like in
the DAE definition from [RS06].
Definition 18 (Multi-user setting for key wrapping). We define experi-
ments Expwrap,realA,KW (η) and Exp
wrap,fake
A,KW (η). In both experiments the adversary can
access a number of keys k1, k2, . . . , kn . . . (which he can ask to be created via a
query NEW). In his other queries, the adversary refers to these keys via symbols
K1, K2, . . . , Kn (where the implicit mapping should be obvious). By abusing nota-
tion we often use Ki as a placeholder for ki so, for example, Wrap
a
Ki(Kj) means
Wrapaki(kj). We now explain the queries that the adversary is allowed to make,
and how they are answered in the two experiments.
– NEW(Ki): a new key ki is generated via ki ← KG(η)
– ENC(Ki, a,m) where m ∈ K ∪ {Ki | i ∈ N} and h ∈ H. The experiment
returns Wrapaki(m).
– TENC(Ki, a,m) where m ∈ K∪ {Ki | i ∈ N} and a ∈ H. The real experiment
returns Wrapaki(m), whereas the fake experiment returns $
|Wrapaki (m)|
– DEC(Ki, a, c): the real experiment returns UnWrap
a
ki(c), the fake experiment
returns ⊥.
– CORR(Ki): the experiment returns ki
Correctness of the wrapping scheme requires that for any k1, k2 ∈ K and any
a ∈ H, if c←Wrapak1(k2) then Unwrapak1(c) = k1.
Consider the directed graph whose nodes are the symbolic keysKi and in which
there is an edge from Ki to Kj if the adversary issues a query ENC(Ki, a,Kj).
We say that a key Ki is corrupt if either the adversary corrupted the key from the
start, or if the key is reachable in the above graph from a corrupt key. If a handle,
respectively pointer, points to a corrupted key, we call the pointer corrupted as
well.
We make the following assumptions on the behaviour of the adversary.
– For all i the query NEW(Ki) is issued at most once.
– All the queries issued by the adversary contain keys that have already been
generated by the experiment.
– The adversary never makes a test query TENC(Ki, a,Kj) if Ki is corrupted
at the end of the experiment.
– If A issues test query TENC(Ki, a,m) then A does not issue TENC(Kj , a
′,m′)
or ENC(Kj , a
′,m′) with (Ki,m) = (K ′j ,m
′)
– The adversary never queries DEC(Ki, a, c) if c was the result of a query
TENC(Ki, a,m) or of a query ENC(Ki, a,m) or Ki is corrupted.
At the end of the execution the adversary has to output a bit b which is also
the result of the experiment. The advantage of adversary A in breaking the
key-wrapping scheme KW is defined by:
AdvwrapKW,A(η) =
∣∣∣Pr [b← Expwrap,realKW,A (η) : b = 1] −
Pr
[
b← Expwrap,fakeKW,A (η) : b = 1
]∣∣∣
and KW is secure if the advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm
is negligible.
Theorem 16. If a symmetric encryption scheme KW = (KG,Wrap,UnWrap)
is secure with respect to Definition 18, then for the protocol version pˆiKW (see
Definition 17), pˆiKW UC-emulates FKW under the condition corrupt-before-wrap.
Proof. Assume for contradiction an environment E such that Pr[EXECE,D,pˆiKW =
1| corrupt-before-wrap] - Pr[IDEALE,Sim,FKW = 1| corrupt-before-wrap] is non-
negligible for all simulators. We fix the following simulator:
phase init:
snd (Algorithms, sid, Wrap, Unwrap) to FKW and enter phase run
phase run:
rcv (Generate,sid) from FKW
snd (Generate,sid ,k ← KG(1η)) to FKW
rcv (Wrap,sid ,ptr ,k,a,m) from FKW
snd (Wrap,sid ,Wrapak(m)) to FKW
otherwise: act like D 
We now generate an adversary B against Definition 18. Internally, it simulates
E , acting for the dummy-adversary, respectively the adversary-simulator, as well
as for pˆiKW , respectively FKW.
– If E sends (Generate, sid) to FKW, B echoes the same message to E ,
pretending to be Sim. It waits for the environment’s response of form
(Generate,sid ,k′) and ignores it. As we are not yet sure whether this key will
become corrupted, we do not emit a NEW query yet. Instead, B draws a
pointer ptr ← P and saves it in the list of uninitialized pointers Pnew . B
sends (Generate•,sid ,ptr) to E . If any of the following commands takes a
key-pointer ptr , output (⊥) in case ptr was not generated in this step.
– If E sends (CorruptionStatus,sid ,ptr) to FKW for a pointer for which it
sent a (Corrupt,sid ,ptr) query before, the output is (CorruptionStatus•,
sid ,Corrupted), otherwise, the output is ⊥.
– If E sends (Corrupt,sid ,ptr) to FKW for an uninitialized pointer ptr , B
emits a query NEW(Kptr , 1). Save the response in kptr . Record ptr as ini-
tialized and corrupted. Record the corruption query for this pointer, to
answer later (CorruptionStatus) queries correctly. If any of the following
commands is called for a key-pointer ptr that is uninitialized, then emit a
query NEW(Kptr , 0) and record ptr as initialized and uncorrupted before
further processing it.
– If E sends (Wrap,sid ,ptr ,a,m) to FKW for an uncorrupted pointer ptr , B
checks if the query TENC (Kptr ,a, m) was emitted before. If this is true,
return the response r to this query saved previously to E , in form of the
message (Wrap•,r). If not, the query is emitted, and the response r sent to
E in the same form, whilst being saved as a response to the query TENC
(Kptr ,a, m). If ptr is corrupted, compute c := Wrap
a
k(m) for the k associated
to ptr . Return (Wrap•, r) to E , where r is the response again. In case m ∈ P ,
if m is uninitialized, B emits a query NEW(Km, 1), saves the response in km
and records m as initialized and corrupted.
– If E sends (Unwrap,sid ,ptr ,a,c) to FKW for a ptr that is marked uncorrupted,
then B responds by sending (Unwrap•, sid , m) for a message m previously
recorded in a query TENC (ptr ,a,m) with response c. If no such query exists,
call DEC (Kptr ,a,c), and use the response in place of m. In case ptr is
corrupted, send (Unwrap•, sid , Unwrapakptr (c)) to E .
First we show that the adversary B is valid, in the sense that it does not
violate any of the five assumptions on his behaviour from Definition 18, then we
show that we provide E with suitable views for the case of the fake, as well as
the real game. First, the probability that (⊥, Collision) is output is negligible. If
this is never output, we can guarantee that all NEW(Ki) queries have distinct i.
Second, before issuing a query, it is checked if the key-pointer has previously been
initialized using a NEW query. Third, TENC(Kptr , a,m) is only queried if Kptr
is uncorrupted. Fourth, ENC is never queried, and B remembers the response
to a previous TENC query, so it does not issue it twice. Fifth, assume ptr to
be uncorrupted. Then, a ciphertext is only part of in a DEC query, if it did not
result from a TENC query to the same functionality before. If ptr is corrupted,
no DEC query is sent. Note that we never emit a ENC-query. Since, by the fourth
condition, it cannot be used on a key that is later used for a test query, it does
not provide for more than an oracle Wrap·k(·) for a randomly drawn k ← KG(1η)
We now show that, for the real experiment, the view of E is the same as
in the real execution. (Generate,sid) generates a random handle ptr ∈ P and
no further output. A key kptr is drawn using KG as soon as ptr is used in
another query for the first time. In the real experiment, (Wrap,sid ,ptr ,a,m)
outputs Wrapakptr (m), performing the same substitution of ptr by kptr that the
experiment performs by “abuse of notation”. Similarly, (Unwrap, sid , ptr , a,
c) outputs Unwrapakptr (c), except in case ptr points to an uncorrupted key k
and c resulted from a previous query TENC(Kptr , a,m). B responds with the
message m that was queried. In this case, by the correctness property we have
that m = Unwrapak(c). If (Corrupt,sid ,ptr) is called, E receives the key kptr that
will be used for all further wrappings and unwrappings for the pointer ptr . If
(CorruptionStatus,sid ,ptr) is called, B outputs, independent of the experiment,
and like both FKW and pˆiKW , whether the pointer is initialized and a corruption
query for this pointer was emitted before. Therefore, E receives the same output
that pˆiKW is defined to produce.
Now we show that, in the fake experiment, the view of E is the same as
in the ideal execution. (Generate,sid) behaves just as before and outputs a
randomly drawn pointer. With the same argument as before, (CorruptionStatus)
is simulated correctly. (Wrap,sid ,ptr ,a,m) outputs Wrapakptr (L
a(kptr ,m)) (m
might be a key or a message) if ptr is uncorrupted, otherwise B computes
Wrapakptr (m) without emitting a query, providing the same outputs as FKW for
corrupted, as well as uncorrupted keys. Again, pointers are substituted by keys
in this step. (Unwrap, sid , ptr , a, c) is a more complicated case: If kptr is an
uncorrupted key and r was the result of a previous (Wrap,ptr ,a,m) query, just
as FKW, the simulation outputs m. If c is uncorrupted, but such a query has not
been made before, DEC(Kptr , a, c) outputs ⊥, and (Unwrap•,sid ,⊥) is output,
exactly as FKW is specified to do. If c is corrupted, the simulation, as well as
FKW compute (Unwrap•, sid , Unwrapakptr (c)).
Since we have established that B is a valid adversary and, as argued before, E
is provided with correct views, we have that Pr[b← Expwrap,realKW,B (η) : b = 1] equals
Pr[EXECE,D,pˆiKW = 1| corrupt-before-wrap], as well as Pr[b ← Expwrap,fakeKW,B (η) :
b = 1] equals Pr[IDEALE,Sim,FKW = 1| corrupt-before-wrap]. Thus, we can con-
clude that AdvwrapKW,A(η) is non-negligible, contradicting the assumption.
